War on Drugs

To: Professor Eric Talbot Jensen

Course: National Security Law

From: Julia Amanda Garza Benitez

Date: May 5, 2010

Subject: War on Drugs

INTRODUCTION

Much has been said in recent years about the Drug Trafficking Organizations (hereinafter “DTOs”) in Mexico whose presence and activities have become more and more evident. It would appear as if though it was an endogenous problem unique to Mexico and threatening the order and national security of only that country. This short paper, although focusing on the current situation in Mexico, will also attempt to put the issue in perspective and show how the situation in Mexico in fact represents a threat to the national security of several other countries in the continent as well (including the United States, Colombia, the Central American and the Caribbean countries), and how it will not be possible to contain it or even less destroy it, with the participation of Mexico alone.

First, this paper will examine the recent history of DTOs in the continent. In particular, it will review the situation experienced in what has been denominated “the Caribbean Corridor”. It will later review the changes that DTOs have experienced in Colombia, particularly how they have lost control over the trafficking into the United States, apparently to Mexican DTOs.

In second place, this paper will review the current situation in Mexico. Particularly, it will examine whether Mexico has become or is becoming a “failed State” as some have claimed; it will review the policies and strategies undertaken by the administration of Felipe Calderon and the main criticisms to his approach to the issue.

It will later explore the ways in which the United States has circumstantially contributed to worsening the situation in Mexico and how it has contributed and is deliberately contributing to solve the problem.

Finally, this paper will propose strategies for tackling the issue. Those strategies would ideally be undertaken simultaneously and in concert by the different countries involved.

THE CARIBBEAN CORRIDOR

Mexico –as well as the Central American countries- is located right in the middle between the world’s biggest drug producer (Colombia) and the world’s biggest drug consumer (United States), making it a natural and necessary stop in the drug’s route from producer to consumer; somewhat an intermediary[1]. Notwithstanding, it is not the only possible route. In fact, “[d]uring the late 1970’s and the 1980’s, drug lords from Medellin and Cali, Colombia established a network of smuggling routes throughout the central Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian Island chain to South Florida, using a variety of techniques to smuggle their cocaine to U. S. markets.”[2] That route has been called the Caribbean Corridor.

The problem in the area was so serious that the United States expanded its operations in Puerto Rico in 1995 significantly reducing the trafficking rate in the area. With the events of September 11, however, the United States shifted its attention from this zone to the Middle-East, where it remains to this date.

In recent times, presumably due to the direct combat against DTOs undertaken by the Mexican government, some drug trafficking may be resurging in the Caribbean. During a recent visit of US Defense Secretary Robert Gates to the Caribbean, he “told leaders in Barbados he wanted to work more closely with the region as pressure on Mexican routs was likely to make smugglers shift their efforts”. Actually, the Caribbean leaders “believe the drug trade through the islands is already increasing as the US pours hundreds of millions of dollars into the fight in Mexico.”[3]

COLOMBIA

Although Colombia continues to be the largest producer of drugs in the world (with about 51% of the world market), its DTOs no longer control the traffic into the United States; on the contrary, “Colombia’s cocaine industry, which once accounted for 6.3% of the nation’s economy, has fallen on hard times since the days of Pablo Escobar’s Medellin cartel”. In the words of a Colombian economist and expert on that country’s drugs trade: “[i]llegal drugs now account for less than 1% of GDP, after peaking in 1987… [s]muggling to the US is now via Mexico… [w]e were left with the agricultural and agro-industrial parts of the business.”[4]

Such shift is likely attributable to the Plan Colombia, as well as the policies in the Caribbean Corridor. Thus, although the drugs are still being produced, they are no longer transported by Colombian DTOs through the Caribbean Corridor but by Mexican DTOs through Mexico.

MEXICO

a) Is Mexico a failed State?

Although the trafficking has clearly shifted to Mexico and Mexican DTOs, it cannot be said of Mexico to be, as of today, a new Colombia. As Ian Bremmer from Eurasia has pointed out, among the factors that make the situation in Mexico different from that of Colombia are: “…the government still maintains control over its territory, the hostility remains largely contained in a few states and among narcotraffickers vying for improved positions within the cartels or between them… Mexico’s drug trafficking violence on a per capital basis remains significantly lower than Colombia’s… Mexico’s narcotraffickers have not targeted civilians in order to support a campaign of fear against the government, even if they do continue to target public officials specifically involved in the fight against them.” [5]

Some, however, believe that Mexico is not only in worse shape than Colombia but that, in fact, it is likely to become a failed State in the near future. So has been stated by the United States Joint Forces Command in its 2008 Joint Operating Environment: “[i]n terms of worst-case scenarios for the Joint Force and indeed the world, two large and important states bear consideration for a rapid and sudden collapse: Pakistan and Mexico”[6]

The Mexican government, on its turn, has been quick to state that Mexico simply does not fit the pattern of a “failed State”; “if one considers the most commonly used variables to identify “failed States”: control over territory, provision of public services, existence of displaced people or refugees, civil disobedience, inability to collect taxes, economic disarray, infant mortality and interaction with the international community; it is difficult to see how this label fits. Mexico has a strong democracy and solid institutions, a vigorous civil society, sound macroeconomic fundamentals, and above all, the Mexican government maintains full control of its territory.”[7]

b) Calderon’s approach

What is certain in any event is that Felipe Calderon is the first Mexican President who has adopted a policy of open and direct combat against DTOs. Since his campaign in 2005 and the beginning of his term in 2006 Calderon has proposed new legislation and put in place different policies to that end. Among those policies are:

- raises to Mexican army, of 46% as of January 2007[8] and an additional 40% as of January 2010[9];

- acquisition of new equipment for the army;

- reforms to National Security Law which grant more powers to intelligence units within the Government and more coordination among entities that deal directly or indirectly with DTOs;

- location and destruction of crops in Mexico;

- training of army (in the past it had been the federal police and not the army who had been in charge)[10].

Simultaneously, local police forces are being purged from corrupt elements. Within three years, all 375,000 municipal and state police officers will go through vetting procedures, including strict polygraph tests. Also, the federal Government has put in place what has been called “Operación Limpieza” –Operation cleanliness- which has led so far to the indictment of a top federal prosecutor, the chief of the Mexican Interpol, and several dozen other public officials.

The following are some figures of the Mexican security forces from 2007 through early 2009:

- detained 59,979 individuals involved in organized crime;

- seized 33,454 firearms, over 4.5 rounds of ammunition, and 2,454 grenades;

- confiscated 15,246 vehicles, 261 boats, and 344 airplanes; seized 77 tons of cocaine, 4,145 tons of marihuana, and 584 kilos of heroin;

- confiscated over $230 million USD in bulk cash.

c) Criticisms to Calderon’s approach

Not everyone agrees with Calderon’s approach, however. Some criticisms to his policies include:

- human rights violations: imprisonment/killing of innocent bystanders, civilians wrongly targeted. No due process to detainees, records kept confidential[11];

- current National Security Law gives too broad and discretionary power to the different entities involved, allowing for abuse of power[12].

Furthermore, Mexico’s total defense spending budget is approximately .4% of its GDP which is insufficient for a country with geopolitical importance of Mexico. The aggregate number of military personnel, approximately 270,000, is inadequate for current mission requirements.

There are also some inherent risks associated with tasking armed forces with counter-DTOs mission:

- increased human rights abuses;

- increased possibility of corruption of the armed forces, both at individual and institutional levels;

- continued and deepened “militarization” of public security in Mexico, with associated risks of greater military involvement in nonmilitary affairs;

- lack of “reserve”: if the armed forces are unable to defeat the DTOs, there would be no resort left[13].

UNITED STATES

a) Circumstantial contributions to the worsening of the situation

A few days before Obama’s first meeting with Mexico’s Calderon, Foreign Policy published an article titled “Why is the United States backing Mexican drug gangs?” The article said that were Calderon to speak his mind, “he could put it simply to Obama: We are fighting your war, and you are supplying our enemies – with demand for their drugs, money for their cartels, and guns for their violence.”[14]

In effect, US drug consumers send at least $12 billion a year (compare to the $1.4 billion funds for the Merida Initiative discussed below) back to Mexico’s cartels; “through bank transfers, money wiring, and even Greyhound bus, the cash is amassed at the southern border, then put into cars and trucks, and shipped south – without a glance from US customs officials. This money keeps the cartels in business, funding corruption and violence.”[15]

The problem doesn’t end there, because the gun situation is even worse since “there are nearly 7,000 gun shops along the southern US border, about three for every mile. They sell thousands of hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, AK-47s, and “cop killer” guns and bullets that cut through Kevlar body armor. The weapons quickly flow south, again with barely a nod from US Border Patrol.”[16]

Finally, the issue of the drug consumption is a very serious one being the United States the biggest consumer of illegal drugs in the world. Whereas the discussion on legalization/decriminalization of drugs is perhaps not likely to yield any definite results in the near future, other policies could and should be explored, such as phrasing the issue as a public health concern, in order to create consciousness in the consumers and hopefully lead to a decrease in the consumption.

b) Contributions to solve the problem

Perhaps the most significant contribution of the United States to the issue to date has been what has been called the “Merida Initiative”. The Merida Initiative was Bush’s initiative, passed by the US Congress in May 2008. The project is expected to contribute $400 million a year, up to $1.4 billion dollars, to Mexico and Central America. The Merida Initiative also promises some sophisticated gear to the Mexican government, including helicopters, speedboats, and high-end database and surveillance systems.

CONCLUSION

In order to successfully tackle the issue of the DTO’s in Mexico, it is fundamental that the different countries involved participate jointly. This appears to be a situation that requires the participation across the continent: from Colombia to the United States, passing by the Caribbean and certainly Mexico.

The Caribbean countries should start by strengthening their law enforcement units now, before there is an even sharper reemergence of trafficking in the area. In Colombia, it is essential to continue with policies of early location and destruction of crops. Perhaps something to keep in mind is that often poor people engage in the growth of crops because of pressure of DTOs, so a social program to redirect their activities may be necessary along with the destruction of the current crops.

The United States could make a significant contribution by: a) regulating (if not completely banning) the sale of certain guns primarily in the border with Mexico; b) drastically curbing the consumption of drugs, if not by de-criminalizing or legalizing the consumption, at least by phrasing the issue as a health concern, in order to encourage the population to quit; and c) by closely monitoring the transfers of funds across the border, mainly from the US to Mexico as payment for drugs.

Finally, Mexico has a lot of work to do, including strengthening of its law enforcement units, training and preparation of the same, developing a stronger and more transparent judicial system, and devoting a larger amount of its GDP to fighting DTOs.

In any event, it is clear that a single country alone will not be able to fully eradicate the growing, trafficking and consumption of drugs.

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[1] According to US ambassador to Mexico, Tony Garza, “drug violence in Mexico would not be so high “were the United States not the largest consumer of illicit drugs and the main suppliers of weapons to the cartels.” See Mexico’s plea to Obama: Curb drug use, The Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 2008, Available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2008/1203/p08s01-comv.html

[2] LtCol J. Brooke Taylor, Caribbean Drug Trafficking and the Western Hemisphere, Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, May 2000. Available at: http://library.jid.org/en/mono39/taylor.htm

[3] US to fight Caribbean drugs routes, BBC News, April 17, 2010. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8626674.stm

[4] Matthew Bristow, Drugs Fade in Colombian Economy, The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2010. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303960604575158203628601096.html

[5] Ian Bremmer, Is Mexico the new Colombia?, Foreign Policy, April 20, 2010. Available at:http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/21/is_mexico_the_new_colombia?showcomments=yes

[6] United States Joint Forces Command, 2008 Joint Operating Environment, Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force, at 36; the report goes on to say: “The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.” Available at: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf

[7] Mexico and the Fight Against Drug-Trafficking and Organized Crime: Setting the Record Straight. Government of Mexico. March 2009.

[8] Claudia Herrera, Calderon assures he delivered to the troop by raising their salary by 46%, La Jornada, February 20, 2007. Available in Spanish at: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/02/20/index.php?section=politica&article=010n2pol

[9] Felipe Calderon announces salary raise to soldiers, Notimina.com, February 19, 2010. Available in Spanish at: http://www.notimina.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1515:felipe-calderon-anuncia-incremento-salarial-a-soldados&catid=33:portada&Itemid=2

[10] The rationale of using the army would be twofold: on the one hand, the army is larger and has more elements; on the other, it is believed that because the army has less ties to the different States, it is less likely to be corrupted.

[11] Mexico: Effective Action Needed by Human Rights Body, Human Rights Watch, February 12, 2008. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/02/12/mexico-effective-action-needed-human-rights-body

[12] Zosimo Camacho, The National Security Law is a failure, October 23, 2007. Available in Spanish at: http://www.voltairenet.org/article152338.html

[13] Craig A. Deare, U.S.-Mexico Defense Relations: An Incompatible Interface, Strategic Forum, No. 243, July 2009, page 8.

[14] Shannon O’Neil, Why is the United States backing Mexican drug gangs?, Foreign Policy, January 12, 2009. Available at: http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/12/why_is_the_united_states_backing_mexican_drug_gangs

[15] Id.

[16] Id.