06 mayo 2010

Zapatista Army for the National Liberation

To: Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley

From: Julia Amanda Garza Benitez

Course: International and Interethnic Conflict Resolution

Date: April 26, 2010
Subject: Zapatista Army for the National Liberation
INTRODUCTION

The Zapatista Army for the National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, hereinafter “EZLN” or “Zapatistas”), surprised Mexico and the world on the wake of January 1, 1994. On that date, “a group of 300 Indian men and women “slipped out of the Lacandon jungle” of eastern Chiapas and “marched into the center of San Cristóbal de las Casas… In a matter of hours, close to 2,000 rebels took over more than 500 ranches and six more towns in eastern and central Chiapas...”[1] The EZLN was in fact calling for a national war against the government and actually identified itself as a belligerent group under the Geneva Conventions on the Law of War[2]. Two days later, the Mexican government responded by sending the army to fight the insurrection.
Despite that episode of violence, however, both the EZLN and the Government, for their own, separate motives and interests[3], soon realized that the best course of action was to bring the conflict to the negotiation table.
Due to restrictions on length, this short paper will discuss the events in the conflict in very general terms and will later attempt to point to some of the legal, political and negotiation issues that the conflict raises.




BACKGROUND OF THE ZAPATISTA INSURRECTION

Chiapas is, paradoxically one of the richest Mexican states in natural resources, as well as one of the poorest, if not the poorest states. In 2003, Chiapas provided Mexico with most of its electricity, as well as much of its corn, timber, beans, gas, and oil. Chiapas supplies Mexico with coffee, cattle, and sugar as well.[4]
Ethnically, Chiapas is constituted almost in its entirety by different indigenous groups, some of which extend beyond the border with Guatemala. For most of Mexico’s history after the Independence, although with a relative recoil around the years of the Revolution (1910-1917), Mexican politics have been “convinced that indigenous languages and customs must soon give way to the forces of progress”.[5]
Indigenous cultural norms and forms have persisted without assimilation and also without recognition within the larger Mexican society. A large percentage of the indigenous population of the state speaks its own language and does not speak, even less write or read, Spanish.[6] Historically, Chiapas’ natural resources and land have been exploited by rich, non-indigenous individuals or corporations, leaving the indigenous population outside.
Against this backdrop, it seems somewhat natural that some of the main issues in the agenda of the EZLN are related precisely to demands for land, recognition, autonomy.
THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT[7]

After the cease fire a few days after the insurrection, the negotiations between the EZLN and the Government began. The eyes of the Mexican civil society and of the whole world were closely following the negotiations, which stalled and resumed several times. In February of 2006, in San Andres Larrainzar, Chiapas, teams representing the EZLN and the Government officially signed a tentative agreement (the San Andres Accords) that included most of the Zapatistas’ demands. The project was conceived as a first step for later amending the Mexican Constitution accordingly. By the end of 2000, however, the Government “had done little to fulfill the spirit of the promises in the compact, especially as it relates to autonomy.”[8]
With a change of ruling party in Mexico in 2000 also came a change in the perception of the conflict, perhaps motivated to a certain extent by a desire to start a new era in Mexican politics, a more transparent and democratic one. On April 25, 2001 Mexico’s Senate passed the bill of the Indian Rights and Culture Law, to amend the Mexican Constitution.[9]
Those amendments, however, did not reflect in its entirety the San Andres Accords. In fact, “[i]n almost all key areas, the Senate added language that said the Indians must act in accordance with the national constitution and laws. That dashed the hopes of Indian supporters hoping to establish broad autonomy for Indians to control local politics, justice, land rights and natural resources based on their traditional practices, outside the jurisdiction of federal law.”[10]
NEGOTIATION ISSUES

With regards to the negotiation of the conflict, two points are particularly relevant. On the one hand, the constant shifting in the Zapatistas’ position –the flexibility of responding to the demands of the civil society and its success in incorporating even larger and more diverse groups into its movement, greatly advanced their leverage in the negotiations and their legitimacy and support. On the other hand, they way the Zapatistas phrased the issue since the very beginning of their campaign turned out to be an unavoidable obstacle in their pursuit of certain demands.


Position shifting

What started as a belligerent group of Chiapas’ indians was by the time of the Indian Rights and Culture Law a pacific, nation-wide movement. When Mexican civil society strongly disapproved the resource to arms, the EZLN responded by offering to negotiate. The Zapatistas also realized early on the importance of including wider and more diverse groups in its front, in order to gain national presence and momentum. The Zapatistas were joined by indians from other states, peasants, workers, intellectuals, professors, students, etc. What started as a geographically localized, violent ethnic movement became a pacific, nation-wide movement for democracy, justice, transparency.


Phrasing the issue

Despite of its later success in including diverse groups, the Zapatistas where however restrained by their own position at the beginning of the negotiations. Because they had phrased the issue as an ethnic issue, the Government –first reluctant but then willing to negotiate in face of the large national and international support- conceded most of the Zapatistas’ ethnic-related requests, but refused to agree to broader economic and land reforms. Paradoxically, the EZLN’s later position –a national movement, a movement in the interest of the nation at large-, was also one of the arguments used by the Government to limit the autonomy of the indigenous populations to the national laws and Constitution.


LEGAL/POLITICAL ISSUES

There are several contradictions in the discourse of the EZLN that also involve legal and political issues. First, there is a contradiction between indigenous rights, that would apply exclusively to a very specific and limited group, and international human rights, that apply to everyone. Second, it is hard to maintain women’s rights in the context of indigenous autonomy since the customs of the indigenous populations tend to be markedly unfavorable toward women. In third place, in the context of a contemporary nation, it is hard to think of giving autonomy to a specific group in detriment not only of other groups that would also claim specific rights, but also in detriment of the national union and Constitutional integrity of the territory. As one scholar has phrased it:
“[p]roposals to recognize “indigenous” customs and to permit regional “autonomy” conflict with the vision of uniform state laws, and with ideas of universal “human rights” and the “rights of women”. Ideas of universal rights advocated by transnational groups, conflict with ideas of state sovereignty, as well as with proposals for local autonomy or the recognition of “indigenous” custom. Ideas of women’s rights and of indigenous people’s rights conflict with visions of universal “human rights”, which are held by everyone regardless of ethnic or gender identity.”[11]


CONCLUSION

The EZLN movement makes it clear that there are multiple and very diverse layers to an ethnic conflict. The EZLN was able to advance its agenda like no other movement in Mexico had before, but this agenda was trumped by the very way the movement started and its own statements as to its objectives. Despite of the positive achievement that it means for the indigenous groups in Chiapas to have obtained a relative autonomy for their communities, other issues of concern remain on the table, namely the consequences upon women’s rights. Furthermore, the very idea of rights held only by certain groups is an issue that demands extreme caution and further study; perhaps even regulation as to its extent and valid circumstances.


[1] Robert Paul Maddox, Today we say, enough, 1 Regent J. Int’l. L. 47 2003 at 48. Citations omitted.
[2] EZLN’s First Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle, December 1, 1994.
[3] See generally Michael W. Foley, Forcing the Political Agenda: The Zapatista Rebellion and the Limits of Ethnic Bargaining in Mexico, 2 Int’l Negotiation 123 1997 at 130-139. Those motives would include, in the case of the Zapatistas, the strong opposition of the civil society to armed conflict; on the part of the Government, it would be related to financial concerns and the fact that NAFTA had entered into force very recently, in fact the same day as the Zapatista movement insurrected.
[4] Maddox at 51.
[5] Foley at 125. In the view of Aida R. Hernandez, however, the political ideology on the issue has been rather like a pendulum, and has “swung from openly promoting the absorption of indigenous cultures into the wider Mexican identity to vindicating the indigenous cultures as “national heritage””. Aida R. Hernandez,, Indigenous Law and Identity Politics in Mexico: Indigenous Men’s and Women’s Struggles for a Multicultural Nation, 25 PoLAR 90 2002 at 92.
[6] For more information regarding Mexico’s population, economy, natural resources, languages, etc. visit: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html
[7] The Zapatistas borrow their name from General Emiliano Zapata, one of the main figures of the Mexican Revolution in the South. He is famous for his phrase “The land belongs to those who labor it”. Zapata was himself a poor peasant and a strong advocate for the redistribution of land.
[8] Maddox at 57.
[9] According to the procedure for the modification of the Constitution, the Senate send the project to the Chamber of Representatives and after the bill is approved by the Chamber it is sent to the state legislatures. A majority of the state legislatures must approve the bill for it to become effective.
[10] Kevin Sullivan, Measure on Mexican Indians' Rights Gets Mixed Reviews, The Washington Post, April 29, 2001. Available at: http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/news/washpost043001.html
[11] Jane F. Collier, Mapping Interlegality In Chiapas, Mexico, 21 PoLAR 150 1998 at 152.

4 comentarios:

Anónimo dijo...

fijate... recuerdo cuando el EZLN empezo a ser noticia, estabamos en la secu, en 2ndo creo porque fue en el 94. al principio pense que era chido, despues, lo estudie y pense que estaba conmadre, hasta que tuve una idea en contra del delegado cero (el sub) en una conferencia en monterrey. pense que era realmente un poser y que queria paleros, apartir de ahi, pienso que es solo tabloides.

geño alvizo

Julia A. Garza dijo...

Sí, parece que su agenda no es tan transparente como se pensaría o como ellos mismos declaraban. Hay otras cosas muy interesantes que no tuve oportunidad de mencionar para este trabajo. Por ejemplo, que las declaraciones de la selva lacandona fueron cambiando marcadamente tanto en estilo como en contenido a través del tiempo. En todo caso, la idea de los derechos indigenistas vale mucho la pena, pero no es válido sostenerla sin evaluar a profundidad las implicaciones de las reformas legales.

Anónimo dijo...

un amigo... dijo algo chistoso, realemente no lo dijo en serio, pero me dio mucha risa... voy a tratar de darme a entender:
resulta que, segun esto: el subcomandante marcos, ahora llamado delegado cero, no es el personaje de tampico que el gobierno quiere que creamos que sea, sino, nada mas y nada menos que: JORGE CAMPOS, el exportero de la seleccion mexicana!!! y es muy facil de explicar porque, digamos, cuando escuchas algo de el subcomandante nunca escuchas algo de el jorge campos, verdad? y cuando escuchas algo de de jorge campos nunca escuchas nada del subcomandante, verdad? es porque son la misma persona, o alguna vez tu los haz visto a los dos en la misma habitacion? verdad que no? claro, saca tus conclusiones, segun mi amigo: JORGE CAMPOS es EL SUBCOMANDANTE MARCOS... jajajajaja!

geño alvizo.

Anónimo dijo...

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